Since the enactment of the 1976 Act, courts have continued to engage in common law development in many important areas of copyright law. The question is whether and how this practice can be squared with the dominant understanding that recognizes the supremacy of the legislature in determining the scope of the law. Some of the innovations raise unique issues, in that they take place in areas where Congress has been silent with respect to copyright, but has enacted specific provisions with respect to patent. It is an open question whether the patent provisions establish broad policies that should be applied to copyright law or whether the failure to enact parallel provisions with respect to copyright gives rise to a negative inference that renders such importation illegitimate.
Arguments raised in the Supreme Court during the briefing and oral argument for States as amicus curiae argued that, even though Congress had twice codified the first sale doctrine, the Supreme Court retained considerable authority to adjust its contours. 4 In so arguing, the government implicitly took the position, largely accepted by the Court, that codification did not necessarily deprive precodification decisions of vitality or foreclose courts from continuing to shape and reshape copyright law.
The propriety of courts continuing to play an active role in articulating and extending copyright depends on the theory one adopts regarding the proper relationship between courts and legislatures. From some viewpoints, courts' ongoing willingness to develop the law is altogether proper and appropriate. From other perspectives, it is potentially problematic.
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 6 Id. (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 13 Moreover, " [t] he fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors."
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Although most courts have organized their discussions of fair use around these four factors, some courts have continued to incorporate others into their analysis. 15 These include such considerations as bad faith, 16 the public interest, 17 and privacy implications.
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B. Copyright Misuse
Another area of copyright law in which courts have continued to innovate since the enactment of the 1976 Act is copyright misuse. The doctrine was first recognized in the Fourth
Circuit's 1990 decision in Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, which held that "a misuse of copyright defense is inherent in the law of copyright just as a misuse of patent defense is inherent in patent law." 19 The court based its decision on the clear establishment of a patent misuse defense by statute, the parallels between patent and copyright under early English law, and "the similarity of the policies underlying patent and copyright." 20 13 Id. 14 Cir. 1990 ). 20 Id.
Since the Fourth Circuit's Lasercomb decision, three additional circuits have recognized copyright misuse as a defense, 21 whereas three other circuits have declined to adopt it. 22 In so doing, some courts have begun to express some discomfort with the lack of statutory authorization. For example, in Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America Inc., the Federal
Circuit noted that the Supreme Court had given its tacit approval of the copyright misuse defense in Loew's, subject to the reservation that "[i]n the absence of any statutory entitlement to a copyright misuse defense, however, the defense is solely an equitable doctrine." 23 Interestingly, some differences in the application of copyright misuse and patent misuse have begun to emerge. For example, a 1988 amendment to the patent statute established that refusal to license does not constitute patent misuse. 24 Copyright courts, however, have continued to rule that refusal to license may constitute copyright misuse. 25 In cases where refusals to license are alleged to violate the antitrust laws, a context that courts have long recognized is closely related to copyright misuse, 26 courts have concluded that the fact that Congress amended the patent statute to exempt refusals to license from misuse while declining to enact a similar amendment to the copyright laws suggests that different policies should apply. This did not absolve it from liability, however, because the filmmaker both expected and encouraged others to use the film in an infringing manner, which was both "the most conspicuous purpose for which [the films] could be used, and the one for which especially they were made." 30 The Court observed that liability for those who did not take part in the final act, but nonetheless contributed to it, is "recognized in every part of the law." 31 Although the Court recognized that "nice questions may arise" when "an ordinary article of commerce" is used for infringement, the filmmaker's complicity was so flagrant that "no such niceties are involved contributory infringement was a lower court case decided before the enactment of the 1976
Act. 41 Similarly, the Court held that its prior decision in Sony "was never meant to foreclose rules of fault-based liability derived from the common law." 42 Rather than develop the common law analysis, the Court followed Sony's lead by analogizing to patent, concluding that the same reasons that led to the Sony Court to adopt the patent law standard for determining when to impute the intent to infringe to a third party based on circumstantial evidence also justified adopting the patent law standard for assessing direct evidence of an unlawful purpose. 43 With the exception of Kalem, the Court built its argument on the authority of lower court patent precedents, citing those decided before the enactment of the Patent Act of 1952 interchangeably with those decided after. 44 Although the Court noted that third-party liability had been codified with respect to patent law, 45 the failure to include a similar provision in the copyright statute did not have any effect on its analysis.
D. First Sale Doctrine
The first sale doctrine originated in the Supreme Court's 1908 decision in Bobbs-Merrill C. v. Straus, which arose when retailer R.H. Macy & Co. purchased books from a publisher that were sold subject to the condition that no dealer was licensed to sell the book for less than one dollar, yet nonetheless resold them for eighty-nine cents. 46 The publisher disclaimed any relief under contract and relied exclusively on the argument that Macy's actions violated copyright 41 See id. at 930 (citing Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162). 42 Id. at 934-35. 43 Id. at 936-37 ("For the same reasons that Sony took the staple-article doctrine of patent law as a model for its copyright safe-harbor rule, the inducement rule, too, is a sensible one for copyright."). 44 Id. at 935. 45 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Kirtsaeng. 73 For the purposes of this chapter, the most interesting position was taken by the Solicitor General, who argued that the Court should resolve the case by applying the principles in embodied Bobbs-Merrill. 74 The government theories that recognize limited judicial authority to continue to innovate.
A. Broad Judicial Authority to Develop the Law in the Face of Adverse Statutory Language
One school of thought holds that courts should feel free to overrule or revise statutes on the same terms as judicial precedents. Lord Coke offered a classic statement of this position in
Bonham's Case, in which he stated his belief that "when an Act of Parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed the common law will control it and processes suffer from institutional shortcomings of their own. 107 Moreover, determining when a statute is out of sync with contemporary values is likely to prove difficult, and the existing proposals fail to provide a clear basis for determining when a statute is so obsolete as to need judicial revision. 108 The absence of such criteria raises serious concerns about whether the resulting approach to interpretation will be too malleable. 109 The lack of interpretive constraints risks politicizing decisions about when a statute should be overridden. 110 Most glaringly, permitting unelected and unaccountable judges to overturn the actions of the politically accountable branches raises serious problems from the standpoint of democracy.
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The conventional wisdom is that recent Supreme Court decisions have exhibited a tendency to favor textualism over evolutive approaches. 112 Although Eskridge denigrates legislative supremacy as a "shibboleth," he concedes that it is a "shibboleth with bite." 113 Text is
given the most weight 114 and, in Eskridge's early work, is even controlling. 115 Thus, codification does not necessarily foreclose later courts from consulting preenactment common law. Nor does it necessarily foreclose courts from continuing to make revisions to an area of law. The easiest case is when the statute itself invites continued judicial development, which poses no analytical problems. 124 The question is more difficult in the absence of such an invitation. As discussed later, the significance of such silence may depend on the background understandings that frame the codification. The omission may suggest a legislative intent not to allow courts to continue to develop the doctrine and will deter judges' willingness to do so, depending on Congress's intent.
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C. Limited Authority for Judicial Development
Between the two extremes of near-complete judicial latitude and complete judicial displacement lies a middle ground that permits a prominent role for judicial development while simultaneously paying sufficient respect to legislative supremacy. 
Affirmative Delegation of Authority to the Judiciary
The strongest case for a strong judicial role in shaping the law after codification arises when the statute affirmatively confers the authority to do so on the courts. The Sherman Antitrust
Act has long been regarded as a prime example of congressional delegation of the responsibility for fashioning legal principles in a common law fashion to the judiciary. 126 Other leading examples include § 301(a) of the Taft Whether a statute cuts off the courts' power to continue to fashion relief is thus itself a matter of statutory interpretation. For example, the Supreme Court looked to legislative intent when determining whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 or a statute authorizing courts to sanction attorneys who unreasonably multiply proceedings abrogated a district court's inherent power to sanction bad-faith conduct by one of the parties. 131 Moreover, because the typical statute does not purport to cover all areas of law, courts' authority to continue to address areas that fall outside its scope remains unaffected.
Analogies to Other Statutes (Particularly Patent Law)
Another important ways without exploring the nature of the differences and any possible implications. 144 Moreover, in Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Court based its argument for sustaining the constitutionality of the copyright term extension primarily on patent precedents. 145 At the same time, it relied on the differences between patent and copyright when rejecting arguments that the statute failed to incorporate the quid pro quo between authors and the public.
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It would thus be improper for courts simply to assume that copyright and patent law are analogous in all aspects. Instead, whether two statutes should be read together is itself a matter of legislative intent. 147 Peter Menell and David Nimmer have provided a useful framework for determining when copyright laws are properly interpreted in pari materia with other statute.
Their careful review of the legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976 revealed that its provisions could be divided into five categories:
1. Enacted provisions that explicitly drew on patent law; 2.
Proposed provisions that explicitly drew on patent law, but were not enacted; 3.
Enacted provisions that self-consciously diverged from the approach taken by patent law; 4.
Enacted provisions that drew on sources of law other than patent law; 5.
Enacted provisions that drew on both patent and trademark law.
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Courts are most justified in drawing on patent law with respect to enacted provisions that were modeled on patent law in whole or in part (categories 1 and 5). Conversely, reference to patent law is inappropriate for provisions that either affirmatively rejected the approach taken by patent law (category 3) or that were based on patent law, but were not enacted by Congress liability on "an employer," which was defined to include "any agent." 154 The omission of a comparable reference to agents in Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 created the negative inference that agency principles did not apply. 155 The Court has drawn similar conclusions in numerous other cases. 156 Practical considerations suggest that courts should take care when drawing such a negative inference. Legislative silence is ambiguous in that it may signal a failure to focus on an issue rather than an affirmative rejection. 157 Moreover, the negative inference depends on what has been called the "one Congress fiction," which presumes that every instantiation of the legislature is aware of the work done by previous Congresses and works to weave all subsequent legislation into a seamless whole. 158 The foregoing discussion underscores the dangers associated with adopting either the polar extreme of allowing judges broad authority to revise statutes or the opposite presumption that an enactment completely displaces further judicial development. The former is inconsistent with the commitment to democracy. The latter is not a blanket principle, but rather a matter of legislative intent that raises questions of both how much judicial authority is displaced within the scope of the statute and of the precise location of the boundaries of the displacement. Although limiting judges to drawing on the approaches taken by related statutes is easier to reconcile with legislative supremacy, reflexively drawing broad analogies between copyright and patent would be a mistake. Instead, courts must determine whether the legislature intended the statutes to be read together and, if so, whether a positive or negative inference would be more appropriate.
III. A REEXAMINATION OF THE EXAMPLES OF CONTINUING JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT
The various theories of legisprudence in turn inform whether continued judicial development in the areas of fair use, misuse, third-party liability, and the first sale doctrine is appropriate. What emerges is not a blanket approach that treats various levels of judicial involvement in a categorical manner. Instead, it yields a context-sensitive inquiry that depends on a close examination of the indicia of legislative intent with respect to the judiciary's role.
A. Fair Use
Of the four examples discussed earlier, fair use represents the easiest case for justifying ongoing judicial development. Both the statutory text and the context surrounding its enactment reveal a legislative intent to delegate to the courts a continuing role in developing the contours of the doctrine. 
B. Misuse
At first blush, continued judicial development in the area of copyright misuse appears to be more problematic. Not only does the statute lack any provision that can be construed as an express delegation of authority to the courts; the inclusion of specific language in the Patent Act Again, a close analysis of the statutes and the context surrounding their enactment reveals subtleties that a more categorical analysis might overlook. The patent statute does not define misuse directly. Instead, it defines certain conduct that cannot constitute misuse. 165 The structure of this provision thus necessarily recognizes patent misuse as a preexisting background principle in front of which the statute was enacted. Moreover, by its own terms, the statute only exempts certain practices from patent misuse doctrine, which only makes sense if the affirmative contours of the doctrine were already established under another source of law and left undisturbed by the amendment. This provision is thus better regarded as a surgical correction to law based on a prior, nonstatutory source of law rather than a comprehensive displacement of existing law.
The limited nature of the statute makes it difficult to draw any strong negative inferences from the failure to include a similar provision in the copyright statute. Quite the contrary, by tacitly confirming the existence of a preexisting patent misuse doctrine, the patent statute implicitly acknowledges the possibility that misuse stems from a nonstatutory source that may well be applicable to copyright.
As the Court noted in Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., which first presented patent misuse in its mature form, patent misuse doctrine stems from the line of precedents holding that practices designed to extend the inventor's monopoly beyond the scope of the patent violate the antitrust laws. 166 The Morton Salt Court applied the "principle of general application that courts, and especially courts of equity, may appropriately withhold their aid where the plaintiff is using the right asserted contrary to the public." 167 The Court would later characterize patent misuse as an extension of the equitable doctrine of unclean hands, under which the courts could refuse to give aid to a party that was violating the antitrust laws. 168 The connection between patent and antirust is so strong that the Supreme Court would later note that "the patent laws . . . are in pari materia with the antitrust laws." 169 Moreover, the patent misuse and antitrust laws became deeply intertwined, with patent misuse cases informing antitrust law and vice versa.
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The Supreme Court's antitrust jurisprudence has long suggested that similar principles apply to copyright law as well. In its 1948 decision in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., the Court cited its patent misuse precedents as the primary authority for holding that bundling copyrighted movies together (a practice known as block booking) violated the antitrust laws.
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The Court drew a similar conclusion in United States v. Loew's, Inc. with respect to the block booking of copyrighted television programs. 172 In so holding, the Court again invoked its patent misuse precedents, holding that just as patent law prohibited the use of tying arrangements to extend a legal monopoly to other products, so too were such practices impermissible under copyright. 173 Both Paramount Pictures and Loew's were antitrust cases and as such did not explicitly recognize copyright misuse, but lower courts have regarded the Court's citation of patent misuse cases in these cases as an implicit endorsement of the doctrine with respect to 167 copyright. 174 To the extent that the interplay between antitrust and copyright is likely the same as the interplay between antitrust and patent, the same considerations supporting patent misuse arguably also support recognizing copyright misuse. 175 Holding that copyright and patent are in pari materia for the purpose of recognizing copyright misuse as a defense does not necessarily extend to all of the doctrine's particulars.
Consider the question whether refusal to license can constitute misuse. Some courts have analogized between these two areas of law and cited the 1988 amendment explicitly providing that refusal to license cannot constitute patent misuse 176 to justify extending the same principle to copyright misuse. 177 Other courts have drawn the opposite conclusion, drawing a negative inference from Congress's failure to enact a similar amendment to the copyright statute. 178 Thus, concluding that copyright and patent are in pari materia with respect to recognizing the copyright misuse defense does not necessitate treating copyright and patent as in pari materia for all aspects of misuse.
C. Third-Party Liability
Compared with fair use and copyright misuse, continuing judicial development of the contours of third-party liability is more problematic. In contrast to fair use, the statute does not evince any legislative delegation of authority to courts to continue to develop the law.
Moreover, unlike with misuse, Congress did enact a comprehensive statute to cover third-party liability for patent infringement. 179 The more expansive nature of the patent statute with respect to third-party liability is more likely to give rise to a negative inference regarding third-party liability with respect to copyright.
Despite the absence of a specific provision governing third-party liability, some courts have regarded the text of the 1976 amendments as supporting the imposition of third-party liability. One of the central changes effected by the Copyright Act of 1976 was its new definition of infringement providing that "the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize" the specified rights associated with copyright protection, including reproduction, the preparation of derivative works, distribution, performance, and display. 180 This language suggests that facilitation of unauthorized uses arguably constitutes direct infringement of the copyright holder's exclusive right to authorize uses of the copyrighted work. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has concluded that the addition of the words "to authorize" "was intended to remove the confusion surrounding contributory and vicarious infringement." 181 It noted the Supreme Court's conclusion in Sony that this language establishes that "'an infringer is not merely one who uses a work without authorization by the copyright owner, but also one who authorizes the use of a copyrighted work without actual authority from the copyright owner. '" 182 This textual analysis draws further support from the enactment context. As a subsequent
Ninth Circuit decision noted, the legislative history specifically provides the following:
Use of the phrase "to authorize" is intended to avoid any questions as to the liability of contributory infringers. the business of renting it out to others for purposes of unauthorized public performance. 183 Another portion of the legislative history ignored by the courts but identified by Menell and Nimmer notes that the House Committee explicitly rejected an amendment to exempt dance halls from copyright liability, concluding that "no justification exists for changing existing law,"
which provides for vicarious liability on those who actively supervise a place where performances occur and who expect commercial gain from those performances. 184 Other courts have drawn the same conclusion.
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The Sony Court could therefore have based third-party liability squarely on the copyright statute itself and used the pre-1976 decisions to determine its contours. Instead, the Court noted the difficulty of attributing third-party liability because "[t]he Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable for infringement committed by another," in contrast to the patent statute, which explicitly provides for liability for inducement and contributory infringement. 186 The
Court nonetheless held that "[t]he absence of such express language in the copyright statute does not preclude the imposition of liability for copyright infringements on certain parties who have not themselves engaged in the infringing activity." 187 Instead of deriving from the statute, thirdparty liability stemmed from broad principles that are applied in all areas of the law. 188 Rather than follow this reasoning to its logical conclusion, the Court borrowed the "staple article of commence" and "substantial noninfringing use" tests from the patent statute. 189 Given the clear statements of desire to codify existing law and the absence of any indication of any intent to import the patent law standard, the Supreme Court would have been better served to turn to the pre-1976 copyright law as a guide. 190 The Grokster Court followed suit by relying primarily on patent law. 191 It did augment the patent analogy with a discussion of pre-1976 copyright cases. 192 The borrowing has become reciprocal. Patent cases have begun to borrow back from copyright law despite their differences (although to the extent the copyright precedents on third-party liability are in effect construing patent law, this reverse borrowing is unproblematic).
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Any commonality that may exist between copyright and patent with respect to third-party liability stems from the fact that they draw from the same source: tort law. 194 Some courts have recognized that third-party liability is properly based in tort law and turned to the pre-1976 copyright cases rather than patent law. 195 Analyzing how this difference in analytical approach would change copyright law is beyond the scope of this chapter. For present purposes, it suffices to note that the difference should matter to those who care about democratic legitimacy and legislative supremacy. Basing third-party liability in tort also provides greater room for judicial development than does a broad analogy to patent law. It would certainly have placed less focus on the meaning of terms such as "staple article of commerce" and "substantial noninfringing use."
D. The First Sale Doctrine
As the briefing and oral argument in Kirtsaeng demonstrated, the Supreme Court is directly confronting the extent to which codification limits the propriety of drawing on judicial sources of law when determining the scope of the first sale doctrine. Courts must determine both the extent to which they can look to precodification judicial precedents for guidance and their ability to effect additional postcodification changes in the manner of associated with the common law.
As noted earlier, the role of courts in developing copyright law is itself a matter of legislative intent. In contrast to the case of fair use, there is no statutory language or legislative history indicating any intent to confer on the courts the authority to shape the first sale doctrine.
Nor is the first sale doctrine a carve out enacted in front of a backdrop of preexisting extrastatutory legal principles, as was the case with the patent misuse principles that were Moreover, as Karl Llewellyn pointed out in his landmark critique of the canons of construction, the principle that statues are to be read in accordance with their common law antecedents is opposed by the canon that the common law gives way to statutes that revise an entire body of law. 212 Put a different way, the whole point of many statutes is to change the law by clarifying ambiguities, by resolving inconsistencies, or by framing the analysis in a more unified and analytically consistent way. Whether any particular part of a codification simply restates existing law or effects some changes is an issue that must be analyzed, not simply presumed.
In short, the continuing relevance of precodification precedent is itself a matter of legislative intent that cannot be presumed simply by reciting a canon of construction. On the contrary, the more natural presumption is that Congress's intentions in this regard may vary from provision to provision. Instead of analyzing the issue, the Kirtsaeng Court simply relied on an inference from silence in Bobbs-Merrill and on a concession by the Solicitor General, who appeared as an amicus. A more direct analysis of legislative intent would have been more appropriate.
In its amicus brief, the U.S. government advanced a subtle argument for giving the courts a more active role that not only preserves the relevance of precodification precedent, but also restrictions facilitate price discrimination, which is widely recognized as a necessary condition to 213 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 4, at 27-29. 214 Id. at 143.
the efficient provision of copyrighted works. 215 Moreover, if companies are unable to prevent copies intended for sale outside the United States from being diverted back to the United States, they will have no choice but to charge a uniform price, which will disadvantage consumers in countries with low willingness or ability to pay.
At the same time, exempting foreign manufactured copies from the first sale doctrine would create a different set of policy anomalies. As Justice Sotomayor noted during oral argument, such a rule would prevent a U.S. resident who bought an edition of a book meant to be sold exclusively in England from bringing it home. 216 As Justice Breyer noted, it would also permit foreign companies who manufacture and sell cars with GPS systems containing copyrighted information to exercise control over the used car market. 217 It would give foreign manufactured copies greater protection than domestically manufactured copies, 218 thereby providing incentives to shift manufacturing operations offshore. 219 The best reading of these statutes still appears to militate against recognizing broad judicial authority to refine the contours of the first sale doctrine. The legislative intent reflected in the statutory text and the legislative history and the interpretive approach reflected in Supreme
Court precedent all suggest that continuing judicial innovation would be improper. Although policy considerations exist on both sides, until the Supreme Court's decision in Kirtsaeng, 220 courts regarded such policy considerations as illegitimate bases for statutory interpretation.
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More to the point, the scope of judicial authority in shaping copyright is not something that can be determined categorically. Instead, it is a contextual question that requires a careful assessment of the legislature's intent with respect to a particular issue. As such, the resolution may depend on the particular theory of legisprudence to which particular judges adhere. More than any other issue discussed in this chapter, the role of the courts with respect to the first sale doctrine depends on the weight placed on text, legislative history, the interpretive approach reflected in the precedents, and policy considerations.
E. Other Doctrines Unaddressed by the Statute
An interesting question is posed by the scope of the judiciary's authority in areas where
Congress has not acted at all. A classic example is with respect to infringement, where in the absence of any legislative guidance the courts have fashioned a wide array of tests to determine whether copying has occurred. 222 Where Congress has not acted, there is no legislative intent to try to discern. Although it is conceivable that the absence of legislation may reflect an affirmative endorsement of the judicially developed law as it existed at any particular moment, at a minimum such a conclusion would require active consideration of a potential intervention and a decision not to do so on the grounds that doing so was unnecessary. And even such action would be ambiguous at best. Legislative inaction can stem from a host of reasons, with a tacit endorsement of the status quo from an affirmative desire to freeze it in place being only one (and a relatively unlikely one at that).
What inference should courts draw about their authority in areas of copyright law that
Congress has left untouched? The absence of legislative intervention into an area gives rise either 222 See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normativity of Copying in Copyright Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 203, 216-20 (2012) .
to an implicit delegation to the courts or at least a tolerance of continued judicial development.
Moreover, as a practical matter, judges must still decide cases even in the absence of affirmative legislative guidance, so it is hard to see what alternative they would have. Such authority would not be an act of federal common law of the type invalidated by Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.
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Instead, it would focus on interpreting broad statutory terms that have not yet received congressional attention, as typically occurred in early copyright cases. All of this would change should Congress choose to intervene. But the scope of that intervention would be subject to the type of contextual analysis undertaken earlier.
CONCLUSION
One of the signature changes of the past few decades is the Supreme Court's growing emphasis on statutory text and on formal approaches to statutory interpretation. As textualism has grown more influential, it has prompted a reaction from those who are dissatisfied with it as a methodology or with the answers that it yields. Those wishing to counter the increasing influence of textualism have begun to call for recognizing greater judicial authority to incorporate contemporary values when construing statutes. Academic dissatisfaction with recent changes to the copyright statutes may make copyright particularly fertile ground for such entreaties.
Any evaluation of these proposals must make sure to honor the basic commitments to democracy reflected in the U.S. system of government. Any proposals that involve giving courts greater authority must also recognize that judicial decision-making processes have their relative institutional competencies as well as the key legitimating function played by legislative supremacy.
Furthermore, closer analysis of the relative positions in this debate reveals that the role of courts in articulating copyright law is not susceptible to simple policy inferences or sweeping generalizations. The question is not so much between judicial and legislative authority in the abstract, but rather an allocation of responsibility that leaves substantial scope for judicial lawmaking, subject to legislatively enacted limits to judicial discretion. Determining the proper balance of decision-making authority between judges and legislators in any particular case thus turns out to be a context-specific inquiry that can vary with each statutory provision and even across issues contained within the same statutory provision. A court should eschew broad categorical approaches, such as categorically analogizing to patent law, in favor of more granular
analysis of the precise contours of legislative intent.
